EU–India relations: a pre-summit explainer

EU–India relations date back to 1962, when India was one of the first countries to establish formal diplomatic ties with the European Economic Community (EEC). Since then, the relationship has evolved unevenly, characterized by high expectations, summitry and persistent underperformance. Despite formal shared commitments to democracy, multilateralism and a rules-based international order, the partnership has often struggled to translate political goodwill into tangible strategic outcomes.

In recent years, however, the geopolitical significance of EU–India relations has rapidly increased. The erosion of the liberal international order, intensifying US–China competition, Russia’s war against Ukraine and uncertainty surrounding American foreign policy have reshaped the strategic calculations of both Brussels and New Delhi. An earlier landmark moment was the European Commission’s first ever full college visit to New Delhi, in February 2025. In this context, India has emerged as a central actor for the Global South, while the EU has sought to consolidate its role as a credible geopolitical actor. In recent years the partnership has experienced renewed interest on both sides in recognition of its significance, a trend that is set to culminate at the EU–India Summit on 27 January 2026 with the finalization of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

As the EU Ambassador to India stated, ‘We are investing in the great potential of India because we also value India as a shaper of the future world order’.

Strategic Autonomy in a Fragmented World

The evolution of the EU–India strategic partnership can be understood in terms of the broader struggles of both actors to define themselves as international powers. They are navigating an international environment marked by intensified great power competition and declining trust in traditional alliances. India’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has increasingly focused on achieving strategic autonomy while avoiding isolation, transitioning from the traditional approach of non-alignment during and after the Cold War to a multi-alignment strategy. Building strong ties with multiple partners, even when interests collide, enables India to consolidate its efforts to become a major power. Similarly, the EU has long aspired to act as a coherent and mature global actor and – as per the 2022 Strategic Compass and other such documents – frames strategic partnerships as tools to consolidate its influence and share global responsibilities.

Although the EU and India formally converge in their support for multilateralism and a rules-based international order, their approaches to global governance differ. The EU has traditionally acted as a normative and institutional champion of multilateral governance, whereas India views multilateralism more instrumentally, emphasizing sovereignty, strategic autonomy and reform to address Global South underrepresentation. Alignment lies in their shared interest in reforming rather than dismantling multilateral institutions amid rising great power rivalry, while differences persist on trade, human rights compliance and security.

The growing unpredictability of the United States has reinforced the appeal of diversification strategies for both the EU and India, as each seeks partners who can offer stability and long-term alignment. Recent tariff pressures on both actors,¹ alongside broader geopolitical frictions – such as EU tensions related to Greenland and NATO, and India’s concerns over US engagement with Pakistan – have further underscored the need to reassess external partnerships.

New Delhi can try to balance American unpredictability and Chinese tension – characterized by unresolved border disputes, mutual mistrust and competing visions for regional and global order – with closer ties with the EU. For India, the attractions of cooperating with the EU include its reliability as a partner with strong technological capabilities, shared concerns and a steady and stable foreign policy. For the EU, engagement with India also reflects its concerns over its own strategic dependencies, particularly on China. Reducing vulnerabilities in supply chains, technology and energy has become central to EU external action. In this context, India emerges as a partner capable of contributing to the EU’s strategic autonomy while pursuing its own interests in technology development, market access and global recognition. Without a deeper partnership, both risk pursuing strategic autonomy in isolation, paradoxically increasing their exposure to external pressures rather than reducing it.

What does the partnership consist of?

Despite early promise, EU–India relations have long underperformed relative to their potential. The launch of the EU–India Strategic Partnership in 2004 was aimed at deepening cooperation across political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. Although it expanded political dialogue and sectoral cooperation, it failed to generate the level of strategic engagement initially envisioned. The relationship has remained declaratory, marked by broad agendas but few concrete deliverables.

Trade relations illustrate these limitations. Negotiations for a comprehensive FTA began in 2007 but stalled and eventually collapsed in 2014. The failure reflected deep differences: Indian concerns about competition in agriculture, dairy and textiles clashed with EU demands regarding labour and environmental standards and regulatory alignment. Fundamentally, the breakdown revealed a lack of political will and India’s determination to protect its manufacturing sector and policy space. In the recent revival in relations, spurred on by converging geopolitical and economic interests, the key areas of renewed engagement include trade liberalization, the strengthening of the strategic partnership framework and connectivity initiatives.

Currently, EU–India trade operates under the Most-Favoured-Nation principle,² with bilateral goods trade reaching approximately €120 billion in 2024, making the EU India’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. A successful FTA is widely viewed as mutually beneficial, yet concerns persist, particularly in India, regarding the automotive, agriculture and textile sectors and environmental conditionality. Bottlenecks such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), high tariffs, complex customs procedures and India’s Quality Control Orders continue to complicate negotiations. At the same time, India has prioritized easier access for skilled professionals to the European labour market, a politically sensitive issue within the EU. Despite these challenges, both sides have signalled a strong political commitment to concluding an agreement before the Summit on 27 January 2026.

These frictions are embedded in deeper historical and normative sensitivities. India has repeatedly criticized what it perceives as EU paternalism and intrusion, particularly in areas such as human rights conditionality and environmental trade measures. Such instruments are often viewed in India as forms of green protectionism that reproduce hierarchical colonial patterns characteristic of EU engagement with partners. As emphasized by observers and scholars, Indian diplomacy places high value on status, recognition and sovereign equality. This is evident in India’s longstanding demands for acknowledgement of its status as a nuclear power, its critique of Western dominance in multilateral institutions and its leadership role within forums such as BRICS. These perspectives explain India’s resistance to arrangements that subordinate its interests or constrain its strategic autonomy.

In September 2025, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Joint Communication outlining a New Strategic EU–India Agenda, which seeks to elevate the partnership through cooperation across five pillars: prosperity, technology, security, connectivity and global governance. This renewed ambition has been generally welcomed in policy circles, where it is viewed as an opportunity to recalibrate the relationship on more equal terms.

Beyond trade and political alignment, the EU and India cooperate through the Global Gateway initiative, notably via the EU–Africa–India Digital Corridor. This project aims to establish a secure and high-capacity data connection between continents and represents a concrete contribution to the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Additional initiatives, such as the Urban Infrastructure and Renewable Energy India Package, promoting climate-friendly urban mobility, expanding renewable energy and developing urban infrastructure, further illustrate efforts to align connectivity, sustainability and strategic presence in India. These initiatives highlight the potential for EU–India cooperation to extend beyond bilateral relations, enabling joint engagement in Africa and Asia while diversifying supply chains for critical raw materials, technologies and digital infrastructure, and enhancing the resilience of connectivity, energy and industrial systems against geopolitical and economic shocks.

The EU–India Trade and Technology Council: A Strategic Experiment

The EU–India Trade and Technology Council (TTC), announced in 2022 and launched in 2023, is a significant institutional innovation that recognizes the interconnections between trade, technology and security.

A response to increasing great power competition, the China factor and the need for strategic autonomy for both parties, the Council has the potential to influence patterns of global economic and technological cooperation. It represents an instrument for both parties to reduce their dependencies on China, and for India to reduce reliance on Russia.

The TTC consists of three pillars. The first focuses on strategic technologies and digital governance, including cooperation on quantum computing, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, digital skills and interoperable digital public infrastructures. The second addresses clean and green technologies, covering renewable energy, green hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and marine plastic pollution. The third and final pillar centres on trade, investment and resilient value chains, with attention to market access, foreign direct investment screening and supply chain diversification.

Tangible outcomes have so far been modest and incremental. The 2023 Memorandum of Understanding on semiconductors established a framework for cooperation on supply chain resilience and innovation, but concrete industrial results remain limited. The second TTC ministerial meeting in February 2025 advanced work on digital public infrastructures, trustworthy AI, future telecommunications and clean technologies. While progress demonstrates the Council’s potential, it has yet to deliver transformative outcomes, and its ability to move EU–India relations beyond declaratory diplomacy will depend on sustained political commitment and effective implementation. The forum enables a strategic level of cooperation that should combine long-term policy initiatives and alignment with short-term responses.

Managing Difference, Building Convergence

Despite these shared objectives, significant differences between India and the EU persist in governance approaches, regulatory frameworks and economic priorities. The EU places a strong emphasis on data protection, privacy, sustainability standards and robust intellectual property enforcement, whereas India prioritizes accessibility, developmental flexibility and national security considerations. These differences are evident in debates over data governance and digital public infrastructure, where European concerns about biometric identification, privacy safeguards and reliance on foreign cloud infrastructure contrast with India’s more state-centric and development-driven digital model. Additionally, concerns about intellectual property protection, market access and the risk of technology leakage in sensitive sectors continue to limit the depth and speed of cooperation under the TTC framework.

Nevertheless, areas of convergence are substantial. Both sides share an interest in strengthening their digital ecosystems, securing semiconductor supply chains, advancing AI Research and Development, facilitating skilled labour mobility and promoting a just green transition. Emphasizing complementarity – such as aligning India’s experience with digital public goods and the EU’s focus on trusted AI – could enable more equal cooperation. Migration cooperation could help rebalance political narratives and address labour shortages in the EU while responding to Indian priorities. From this perspective, the TTC becomes a test of whether the EU can engage India on post-hierarchical terms. It has the potential either to mitigate structural asymmetries by enabling co-governance and mutual recognition, or to reinforce them if regulatory and economic imbalances persist.

A Test Case for EU Engagement with Emerging Powers

The EU–India Trade and Technology Council represents a milestone in bilateral relations and a potential turning point in the EU’s engagement with emerging powers. It reflects growing strategic convergence and recognition of India as a key player in the future world order. However, its ability to deliver a genuinely strategic partnership will depend on whether both sides can move beyond historical frictions, acknowledge each other’s needs and adapt governance frameworks accordingly.

To achieve long-term coordination and alignment, it is essential that the EU listens carefully to its partners. What is at stake is not only the effectiveness of EU–India relations, but the credibility of the EU’s broader approach to engaging with emerging powers in a multipolar world.

While the TTC alone cannot resolve all underlying differences, it offers a critical platform for experimentation and trust-building. If embedded within a broader, balanced strategic agenda and supported by tangible outcomes – particularly through a trade deal – it could significantly elevate EU–India relations. Ultimately, the TTC’s success will signal whether the EU is capable of engaging emerging powers like India as equal partners in shaping global economic and technological governance.