France’s Forward Deterrence: Macron’s nuclear offer to Europe

The regular presidential address on France’s national nuclear deterrence may appear to be a mere tradition. In reality, it constitutes an essential component of the credibility of French deterrence. Under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the President bears sole responsibility for the nation’s nuclear forces and would take the decision to employ them alone. His unwavering resolve must, therefore, be clearly signalled both to those whom the nuclear capacity protects and to potential adversaries.

The address, delivered by successive presidents since 1958, reaffirms this resolve and justifies the nation’s sustained effort to develop and maintain a credible nuclear force. The fundamental principles of French nuclear strategy have remained immutable.

First, it is strictly defensive in nature. French nuclear weapons can be used only in the most extreme circumstances of self-defence to protect France’s vital interests. It has long been affirmed that a ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. French nuclear forces serve a strategic deterrent function and are not conceived as tactical weapons.

Second, the notion of France’s ‘vital interests’ deliberately retains a degree of strategic ambiguity, which is itself an integral component of deterrence. Nevertheless, from the outset of the Fifth Republic – beginning with General de Gaulle – it was clearly stated that French nuclear capability also possesses a European dimension.

Yesterday’s speech was therefore widely anticipated and examined in exceptional detail. Several factors explain this heightened scrutiny.

The global strategic landscape is changing dramatically. The American protection on which other EU member states have long relied has become more uncertain, even if it has recently been reaffirmed within NATO. At the same time, the Russian threat has become even more explicit, notably through the revision of its national nuclear doctrine, which expands the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used. Meanwhile, key arms control and non-proliferation arrangements are either expiring or under increasing strain.

These developments have prompted several European capitals to seek nuclear reassurance beyond the American umbrella. A debate is now underway in Germany, Poland and Sweden in particular. It explores a range of options, some of which would until recently have been considered taboo. An academic paper presented in the framework of the Munich Security Conference outlines several possibilities: reinforcing reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence; expanding the role of France and the United Kingdom; developing a Eurodeterrent; acquiring independent national nuclear arsenals; or strengthening conventional deterrence. The authors conclude that ‘none of these options is a good one’. In the short term, they nevertheless recommend continued reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence, while urging Europeans to consider all options and warning against ‘outsourcing’ strategic thinking in this domain to the United States.

President Emmanuel Macron’s speech made clear that France does not outsource its strategic thinking – another longstanding feature of French deterrence policy. This does not imply competition or a lack of cooperation, as France consistently makes clear that its independent national capability, like that of the United Kingdom, complements American deterrence and arrangements with NATO.

Another reason for the timing of such a speech is the uncertain outcome of next year’s presidential election, which is a serious concern in France, but also among European partners. Such worries are directly linked to the specific decision-making structure that governs nuclear use: the President alone decides, as does the President of the United States. Uncertainty regarding the personality and strategic outlook of the individual who might ultimately have to ‘push the button’ is an alarming prospect for the beneficiaries of any form of extended deterrence.

Expectations were therefore high that Macron might announce decisions that future presidents would find difficult to reverse, should they wish to do so. Did yesterday’s speech meet these expectations? The answer is undeniably positive. Rather than a revolutionary shift, the speech offered a clever and thoughtful adaptation to the new strategic context. The concept of ‘advanced deterrence’ provides the operationalization of the European dimension of France’s nuclear capability. Building on the cooperation already in place with the United Kingdom, seven EU countries will now participate in this arrangement: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden.

Together with the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, a declaration was immediately issued presenting the initiative and reaffirming its complementarity with NATO. Concrete steps will begin this year, including the establishment of a nuclear steering group, Germany’s conventional participation in French nuclear exercises and joint visits to strategic sites. Comparable bilateral arrangements will also be developed with the other partners. To strengthen deterrence – to ‘shoulder’ it, in the President’s words – while avoiding questions over financial burden-sharing, cooperation will focus primarily on conventional capabilities such as early warning systems, air defence and deep precision strike. This cooperation will be gradual and could eventually include the situational deployment of elements of French strategic forces on allied territory.

The largely positive reactions across Europe – with the expected exception of Russia – demonstrate how carefully prepared and politically mature this posture is. The notably moderate reactions within France, including among habitual critics of the president, suggest not only that the performance was flawless but also that a broader national consensus might be emerging. Such consensus is essential: it reassures partners of France’s reliability and signals national resolve to potential adversaries.

The value of France’s renewed deterrence posture lies not only in the effort and resolve of the French nation, it also rests on the growing convergence among Europeans regarding their strategic interests – expressed not merely through declarations, but through concrete operational cooperation. The alignment around the contribution of French deterrence should now be confirmed and further strengthened. It must be supported by ambitious and systematic cooperation across the full range of strategic capabilities.