Pulling together the Pillars of Hercules

‘Non plus ultra’ – nothing further beyond – was once said to be carved into the Pillars of Hercules at the Strait of Gibraltar, marking the limits of the known world. Today, the mere fourteen kilometres separating those ancient markers feel far wider. The Mediterranean, once a shared economic and cultural space, has hardened into a psychological border: Europe projecting anxieties about migration and the fear of ‘small boats’, Africa pushing back against lingering paternalism, and the suspicion that Western engagement is simply extraction by other means.

November’s G20 summit in Johannesburg – the first on African soil – and the African and European Unions’ (AU-EU) summit marking 25 years of partnership in Luanda were reminders that both continents are now operating in a new, more competitive geopolitical environment. It also exposed the narratives each side holds about the other. As Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, the Kenyan author and academic, writes in Decolonising the Mind, renewal begins with ‘seeing ourselves clearly’. Europe and Africa must first examine the stories they have inherited – both connected to the colonial era and to Europe’s relationship with the US – if they are to move beyond them.

Africa’s assertiveness was unmistakable in Johannesburg. Leaders focused on debt sustainability, critical minerals and capturing more value from the energy transition. The US boycott, justified through claims of ‘a South African genocide of white farmers’ and other objections, created headlines but did little to distract from the G20’s underlying message: African governments are increasingly prepared to push back against Western attempts to set the frame. Europe took a less combative and more conciliatory approach than the US. Speaking in Luanda, Ursula von der Leyen declared that ‘the case for Africa and Europe to join forces is overwhelming’, describing shared interests and mutual destiny while taking aim at rivals who ‘drill, mine and take the profits away’.

Both summits underlined how much Europe still invests in multilateral diplomacy. In Johannesburg, Macron highlighted Africa’s role in ‘the concert of nations’ and recalled that France was advocating two permanent members’ seats for Africa in the United Nations Security Council. He also used the gathering to hold a string of bilaterals and an E3 meeting with France, Germany and the UK. German Chancellor Merz reaffirmed his support for the G20 format in response to US threats to exclude South Africa from the 2026 meeting. Italy, meanwhile, pushed its Mattei Plan for Africa, with Prime Minister Meloni calling for a partnership based on mutual respect. Together, the European leaders presented a coherent vision: one that acknowledges Africa’s growing agency while signalling Europe’s desire for a more balanced, interest-driven relationship.

Europe’s challenge is whether it can match its rhetoric with credibility. Macron’s 2017 Ouagadougou speech insisting that ‘there is no longer a French Africa policy’ sought to close a chapter on Françafrique. But Africa now focuses less on Europe than it once did. Despite Europe’s enduring soft power, many African leaders see the ‘Asian Tigers’, not the EU, as the more relevant model for industrialization. Countries across the continent have diversified their partnerships with China, Russia, Turkey, the UAE and others, a pragmatic adaptation to multipolarity. The UAE, with a population the size of Belgium’s, is now Africa’s fourth-largest investor.

Against this backdrop, Europe needs to examine both its tone and the technical tools for implementing its approach. Compared to a faster-paced and less scrupulous China, the refrain has often been ‘China makes Africa an offer it cannot refuse; Europe makes one it cannot understand’. The EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and its Global Gateway initiative aim to shift the relationship with the Global South from an aid-based model to something more strategic. The Lobito Corridor designed to move cobalt and copper from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia to the Atlantic, reducing reliance on Chinese-controlled corridors, is the most visible example.

Yet Europe’s approach is not without potential pitfalls. Some critics fear Europe risks reproducing the old, colonial pattern in which Africa exports raw materials and imports finished goods, entrenching dependency rather than enabling transformation. A partnership that aspires to an equal footing must align with Africa’s priorities, particularly its push to build a functioning continental free trade area, and its need for relief from a debt burden that often eclipses spending on health or education.

The outcomes of the back-to-back meetings are not trivial. The G20 Leaders’ Declaration tilts unmistakably toward Global South priorities: debt relief and financial-system reform, climate and just-transition finance, and a stronger voice for developing countries in global governance. Only the US and Argentina refused to sign, with Washington promising a ‘back-to-basics’ G20 when it hosts next year. But rhetoric is the easy part; real impact will hinge on follow-through, financing and political will, and on whether North–South cooperation can advance alongside a deepening web of South–South alliances, shaping a more genuinely multilateral order. In future, resource-rich African countries will certainly have more leverage to set the terms.

At the AU-EU summit, African leaders built on the G20 momentum with the declaration capturing an evolving, interest-driven relationship on more equal terms. It also endorses the implementation of the EU’s flagship Global Gateway initiative as a framework for future cooperation.

Europe has many good reasons to look south – and Africa north. An ageing population and labour shortages contrast with Africa’s demographic dynamism and expanding markets. Europe retains capital, institutions and technological strength; Africa brings essential minerals and human talent. Geography reinforces the logic, with Africa’s east coast providing access to the strategic shipping routes linking the Indo-Pacific to Europe.

Still, structural incentives alone will not shift the dial on the relationship. Many of the barriers to deeper cooperation are psychological rather than material. European debates about migration often cast Africa as a threat; African scepticism about Western engagement often assumes exploitation is inevitable. Neither view serves the interests of either continent. As Ngũgĩ reminds us, clarity starts with examining the narratives we carry.

Europe and Africa now face the task of spanning what is less a physical divide than a mental one. In an era of multipolar competition and shared vulnerabilities, the space between the Pillars of Hercules no longer marks the edge of the world but the joining of two continents and a shared destiny.