Towards the end of Ukraine’s ordeal - or into a new nightmare?

Amid a maelstrom of peace plans, ceasefire negotiations, leaks and reactions, mixing hope and indignation, while the war rages on with ever greater violence, predicting the outcome is a bold endeavour.  

It is widely acknowledged that the toughest issues for any peace plan are the territorial decisions and the security guarantees for Ukraine. Yet, among the 28 points allegedly agreed by Russians and Americans two weeks ago, some are particularly worrying: the proposed disarmament of Ukraine, interference in its political sovereignty, and the unvarnished financial predation.  

European support for Ukraine – currently €187 billion, as highlighted by High Representative Kallas on Monday 1 December – consists of financial aid and military assistance. The concept adopted by European authorities was to ‘porcupine’ Ukraine, that is to help it defend itself by providing weapons and training to Ukrainian forces. ‘Rearming’ Europe is expected to happen in close cooperation with Ukraine. Europeans have even agreed to pay for American military equipment to be delivered to Ukraine under NATO’s ‘PURL’ initiative, following an agreement between NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US President Trump last July. Further procurements are planned, such as contracts for Rafale and Grippen (the French and Swedish jet fighters). However, it was envisaged, not only by Moscow, unsurprisingly, but alarmingly also by Washington, that Ukraine halve the size of its armed forces and armaments. Under such a plan, Ukraine would not be ‘porcupined’ but severely disarmed – which is quite a different proposition to neutrality – and open to further aggression.  

At the same time, Russians and Americans are looking to dictate the political agenda of the sovereign state – requiring elections within 100 days – perhaps with the objective of getting rid of President Zelenskyy. A prospect that has been reinforced by the coincidence of domestic corruption scandals that are undermining his government. The imposition of a timeline combined with the inevitable election interference increases the risk of a radical political change in Ukraine. Putin will have no need for a further ‘special operation’ – costly and relatively inefficient – if ‘regime change’ can be achieved through manipulation. Georgia’s former president Salomé Zourabichvili describes eloquently the manoeuvres in her own country and how a similar situation could emerge in Ukraine. In such a scenario, not only would our present financial transfers become available to a new regime, hostile to the EU, but also our armaments and access to their technology. This risk has presumably been anticipated. What is novel about this situation is that this interference in Ukrainian political sovereignty is endorsed by the US government. Even if this point were no longer mentioned in peace arrangements, it remains an objective for both Trump and Putin.  

Another threat lurking in the bilateral talks between Washington and Moscow is financial and economic predation. This began with the arrangement over natural resources imposed on Zelenskyy by Trump months ago. Now this ‘deal’ underpins the idea of using frozen Russian assets for American projects in Ukraine, including in cooperation with Russia.  

One can always hope for the best: the negotiations are volatile, the Ukrainians had the opportunity to express their views a posteriori, as did the Europeans. But the Russians show no intention of conceding any acceptance of Zelenskyy’s or Europeans’ amendments or any involvement at all of Europeans, with the glorious exception of Viktor Orbán. At some point, Trump might lose patience and react impulsively. His frustration could swing in either direction: sanctioning the Russians and increasing support for Ukraine, or denouncing Ukrainians’ and Europeans’ ‘foolishness’ and ‘ingratitude’ and letting them down, or even blaming them, dropping the issue and allowing events to unfold.  

Amid such uncertainty, a few fundamentals can be discerned that are rooted less in personalities than in core national interests.  

Americans have no interest in being entangled in war in Europe. They never had. They were forced to engage in direct combat in World War I by German attacks in the Atlantic and intrigues with Mexico, and in World War II by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and Germany’s subsequent declaration of war. Their human sacrifice was immense, and they will not contemplate the loss of US lives for European affairs, especially in a nuclear context. Their essential interest lies in the East, as they have been saying since Obama. President Trump personally champions peace and wants it to be his legacy. It is a priority that aligns with a key American objective: business. ‘Make money, not war’ – as the Wall Street Journal titled a recent article about the current bilateral talks between US and Russian envoys – could be the Trump administration’s motto. There is an interesting dilemma at stake for America. Although Europe may be of minor US strategic importance today, it is of huge relevance economically as a rival, but more importantly as a rich and complacent customer. Europe is a market, and largely a ‘captive’ market. That is why the military alliance remains relevant; the functioning of NATO provides lucrative contracts for the American defence industry. Such conflicts of interest lead the US to bully and blackmail the Europeans but not to abandon such a prosperous market entirely. Russia may offer interesting natural resources and business prospects, but not in comparison to Europe, considering its demography, wealth and investment security. One could add that for the US, if Europe demonstrates resolve, it remains a useful ally, the only reliable one perhaps, offering secure ‘redundancies’¹ in a world of multiple threats, notably in cyber and space.  

Subservience is not good enough. Building effective European power is the only viable way forward. Additionally, Europe must be prepared for financial challenges when the war does end: we might hope for ‘reparations’ from Russia; yet lessons from the post-World War I era tell us that the United States prioritizes its own debt repayments above any reparation claims. The projects regarding the frozen Russian assets offer a glimpse of the likely American approach. The European Union will have to bear the costs of Ukraine’s reconstruction. The Russians obviously harbour ‘imperial’ ambitions. At the very least, they want to keep Ukraine in their sphere and believe it should never have been separated from Russia in the first place. They do not want an extension of NATO to their borders, or a European military presence in Ukraine as part of its security guarantees. They have no objection to Ukraine’s accession to the EU, probably due to their contempt for the EU, but perhaps also because an EU of 35 members, including a divided, impoverished, partly razed and fragile country like Ukraine, could become dysfunctional. They intend to take as much as they can get. However, the extent to which they have an interest in prolonging the war and the latitude to do so is less clear. War may serve a tyrannical or an ‘imperial’ power, but only to a point, as Russian history demonstrates. Propaganda on all sides is such that it is difficult to assess Russia’s actual economic, social and political resilience. What seems clear, however, is that the potential, whether of demography, economy or technology, is far from unlimited. Compensating for shortfalls comes at the cost of increased reliance and dependency on China. This is not in Russia’s interest and never has been. Russia is playing chess by exploiting all moves of its adversary, but it no longer has many pieces left on the board to deploy.  

The Ukrainians have now been suffering and fighting for their lives and freedom for four years. Europeans support them, but with limits and uncertainties. The Americans have not only wavered but shifted towards hostility to Ukraine and sympathy for Russia’s views. European resolve to replace the American security umbrella is uneven and fragile, because of dependency on American enablers and technology, not to mention the reliance on the US nuclear deterrent. The desperate request for a US security ‘backstop’ undermines the credibility of Europe’s own guarantees. Ukraine is permanently on the brink of financial collapse. The stalemate created by the Commission – at the request of a majority of Member States, to be fair – over the use of frozen Russian assets in the face of any proper answer to the risks to European monetary credibility at large, and to Belgium in particular, highlights the fragility of European support. Weakened by corruption scandals, facing intensified military attacks, a shortage of soldiers and uncertain international backing, President Zelenskyy eloquently expressed the Ukrainians’ tragic dilemma: they need peace or a cease-fire, but cannot afford capitulation.  

The Europeans are facing a situation they failed to anticipate, despite repeated and consistent warnings. Their dependence on the US is not an insurance policy but a risk – a major one. This weakness may see them fall short of their bold commitments to Ukraine to offer ‘whatever it takes’ to regain its territorial integrity and sovereignty, until ‘Russian defeat’ and EU membership at an accelerated pace, to paraphrase the EU’s public declarations. On the international stage, words are more convincing when they align with fundamental interests and are backed by action.  

What are the European interests? To see an end to a terrible war while preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and its military and economic strength; to deter any further Russian military aggression; to halt the non-conventional dimension of the war, the ‘hybrid’ anonymous attacks (cyber or drones), threats in space and interference in our political, social and cultural life. As Giuliano da Empoli observes, attack is cheaper than defence, which gives predators a fundamental advantage. Such a confrontation requires capabilities and the will to respond. Europe must build and demonstrate its power, becoming directly involved through the initiative of European protagonists in negotiating arrangements on both the continent’s and global security.  

Notes

1 Redundancies such as Europe’s satellite navigation system Galileo as an alternate to the US GPS. ↩