Four BIG questions

Question 1. With adequate support from Europe – excluding troops on the ground – can Ukraine feasibly build its own deterrence against Russia?

Yes, with adequate financial support, Ukraine is fully capable of building its own defence system to deter Russia in the current format of hostilities. This is not just about drones – in the air, on land and sea – but about our own production of artillery, grenade launchers, armoured vehicles and, most importantly, a combat ecosystem that makes R&D a core part of our resistance.

Of course, for full parity with Russia, we would need to develop nuclear weapons, but in the position of European leaders, I would do everything possible to ensure that neither Ukraine nor other countries subject to military aggression feel the need to pursue nuclear capabilities.

When I speak of ‘adequate support from Europe’, we must understand that Ukrainians have long thought in terms of continent-wide security.

In this context, we need to support the Ukrainian defence industry (which is the most cost-effective and the most adapted to war conditions of anywhere in Europe), but also to make Ukraine part of European supply chains and involve the most knowledge-intensive and innovative European industries in building common security. Projects like the development of the European equivalent of the Patriot, the SAMP-T system, should become pan-European, and Ukraine can offer infinitely valuable contributions in terms of data analysis and operational experience.

Question 2. As the question of military mobility garners renewed attention in Brussels, what lessons can your experience offer regarding the state of Europe's defence infrastructure and strategic coordination?

A bigger problem for military mobility than the physical infrastructure is the lack of a common space for EU countries on defence matters. Transportation, exports and technology exchange are not taking place within the framework of the long-standing aspiration to create a ‘European Defence Industrial Union’. Ultimately, this is slowing us all down significantly.

Our team has developed the concept of an International Defence Procurement Agency. This agency, through which joint procurement for Ukraine’s defence needs will be undertaken, should be jointly owned by Ukraine and other countries that are champions of Ukraine’s support.

It is through such instruments, which require nations to at least partially relinquish their protectionist policies in the defence sector and enter a common competitive market, that I see the way to overcome the fragmentation of the European defence industry and, ultimately, to improve our shared effectiveness.

Question 3. Do Ukrainians perceive the current peace deal situation in the same way as the Ukrainian government? What are the faultlines in Ukrainian opinion as to how to proceed?

Firstly, regarding Zelenskyy’s communications: I believe it is high time for us to moderate the tone of communication from the president, the government, and the defence forces to a more restrained, factual one that honestly acknowledges the challenges facing the state.

Perhaps President Zelenskyy was recalling the speeches of Winston Churchill, who changed his rhetoric during World War II, acknowledging the existential danger the country faced and directing the efforts of both the military and the civilian population.

People who rarely visit Ukraine probably do not realize that we still inhabit a reality where peaceful and military life are interconnected yet sometimes exist in parallel.

Unfortunately, I do not have access to opinion poll surveys, but my subjective impression is that Ukrainians have very low expectations of the next negotiation wave. When people first saw the 28-point plan, many commented, ‘We have already seen this.’ It was as if the US and Russian security advisors decided to fulfil their own key performance indicators to get their bonuses before the New Year, by giving the stillborn vision of peace on Russian principles one more shot.

At the same time, the experience of Russian warfare over the past 20 years tells us the same thing: this is their negotiating style; they talk while continuing to fight.

Despite the fatigue and the daily tragedies, Ukrainians know very well why we cannot accept plans like the 28-point draft; such an agreement creates the conditions for the aggressor to continue its aggression, which will mean more deaths and destruction, more stolen children and more Ukrainians mobilized to fight a war waged against the whole of Europe. The fact that Ukraine is even considering a freeze on the demarcation line is already a huge concession on our part. Ukraine will continue to resist, and Russia does not have enough conventional weapons to wipe us – the entire country and all its cities – off the face of the earth. We are a sizable nation, and even considering those forced to flee the war, there are at least 25 million people here. We have nowhere to go; this is our home, and we have to protect it.

Question 4. American support has been conditional on compromises to Ukraine's economic sovereignty, from minerals rights to the proceeds from frozen Russian assets. How can Kyiv reconcile national economic security with the imperatives of reconstruction?

This issue cannot be approached without considering the context of Ukraine's priority of European integration and the commitments we have already made to the European Union.

Of course, Trump's rhetoric on these issues leaves little room for interpretation, but the practical way to implement these mineral agreements remains a major question.

The only fair way may be to finance Ukraine's reconstruction with Russia’s captured funds.

We see that a just peace under these conditions is already in question, but this does not mean that we will not attain it in the future.

Now the priority is to survive, including economically. Thanks to the systemic support of partners and the courage of the Ukrainian people – at the front, in the fields and in manufacturing – the economy of Ukraine is alive and developing.

The loss of macro-financial assistance will significantly undermine the stability of the system, so in this case, we look less to America and more to the unblocking of frozen Russian assets.