The EU needs an Economic Security Council

Trade is as much a weapon of war as it is a path towards peace and prosperity. In today’s geo-economic age, shaped by Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, markets, technology and critical materials have become battlegrounds of power. Almost every economic decision by states today carries strategic weight.

Reluctantly but unmistakenly, this reality is being acknowledged in Brussels’ policymaking circles. This past summer the EU accepted asymmetric US tariffs, not just as the price for maintaining access to American markets but also for keeping Washington engaged in NATO and Ukraine. Though the negotiations were led by trade officials, the decision was fundamentally one of security. In such a high-stakes situation, who should have spoken for Europe’s strategic interests and made the final deal?

The majority of the public in France, Germany and other member states considered the EU-US deal ‘humiliating’, even calling for Von der Leyen’s resignation. Had she sought overt backing from national leaders, her position would have been less uncomfortable.

The integration of commerce and statecraft is challenging governments across Europe. Germany is creating a National Security Council; from Paris to Copenhagen and Warsaw, similar initiatives have been or are being taken. The EU, however, remains structurally ill-equipped to handle this new trade reality and seems in no rush to bolster its governance for the age of geo-economics. Its siloed institutions, reliance on law and depoliticizing instincts worked well in the post-1989 period of globalization, yet they leave Europe unprepared for today’s dilemmas.

When trade-offs are acknowledged in Brussels, they are too often handled through improvised phone calls among top officials from the Commission and some larger member states. Compromises are made behind closed doors, outside any parliamentary scrutiny. Such methods were defensible during shocks like Covid-19 or the 2022 energy crisis in the name of efficiency, but not any longer. It is not only that too much power is concentrated in an inner circle of non-mandated officials, the risk of political blunders due to lack of foresight and strategic nous is real.

Why doing nothing is irresponsible

Economic statecraft, the art of using economic power for foreign policy or security goals, is a new mission. It is currently in evidence in the levying of sanctions on Russia. The EU has been endowed with major economic competences, so deploying the single market – the Union’s greatest source of economic power – for strategic ends unavoidably requires EU policymaking and coordinated political leadership from the heads of government.

Failure to adapt would have two consequences. First, EU institutions designed to regulate markets risk de facto shaping foreign policy, producing unbalanced outcomes and misunderstandings. The enforcement of the Digital Services Act against US platforms illustrates this danger. It may seem like routine regulation (and might have been under other circumstances) but today it carries the potential to rupture transatlantic ties – even though Elon Musk has now left the White House. Such decisions are hardly the domain of mid-level Commission officials.

Second, democratic legitimacy is at stake. The Commission derives its authority mainly from neutrality and technical expertise. But once it makes geopolitical trade-offs, this narrative collapses. When enforcement decisions risk provoking US threats to NATO, the old institutional story looks absurd.

A European Economic Security Council

In September, the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics published a new report, which I co-authored with Hans Kribbe, that proposes an institutional solution to the current void, namely a European Economic Security Council (EESC).

The EESC would bring together leaders and institutions from both the legal-economic and the security domains, equipped with the political authority to set priorities and the expertise to guide decisions. Modelled on the US National Security Council in Washington, it has three levels.

At the top level, the 27 heads of state and government would serve as decision-makers of last resort, alongside the presidents of the European Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Eurogroup, and the High Representative. At ambassador level, the Permanent Representatives, and the other EU bodies present around the leaders’ table, would form an ongoing forum chaired by the Adviser. These two levels reassemble and adjust familiar pieces on the institutional board (the European Council and COREPER-II); here the new body to some extent codifies informal practices.

The innovation of the EESC lies in its working level: 27 newly appointed national economic security coordinators would assess the geostrategic implications of EU proposals early, preventing them from getting lost in the great soup of Brussels’ policymaking. Their forum is steered by an EU Economic Security Adviser, appointed by the European Council. This adviser would also lead a task force of experts, responsible for foresight, risk analysis and contingency planning. The adviser would focus on the frontline, injecting urgency and connecting the issue to the European Council, the Union’s highest political authority (this is similar to how Michel Barnier during the UK divorce proceedings became Monsieur Brexit).

Becoming a strategic polity

For any such proposal, resistance will come from two sources. Among member states, wary of a Brussels power grab, scepticism over the EU taking a stronger role in economic statecraft remains. But as the EU’s legal-economic competences increasingly shape security, strategic governance is inevitable. Member states will have to make up their minds: either allow unaccountable Brussels officials to make hidden geopolitical decisions (while hoping their capital is among the few still being listened to), or create a forum where trade-offs are openly debated and judged by elected leaders.

Brussels policymaking circles will also tend to resist an innovation such as the Economic Security Council. The Commission has been quietly accumulating power in the foreign policy domain, including at the expense of the European External Action Service. Voiced concerns will centre on ‘complication’ or a risk of ‘securitization’ with vested interests remaining mute.

Yet Europe’s challenge is real and urgent. Without change, the continent will remain vulnerable to stronger powers willing to decide its future. An Economic Security Council offers a way to harness Europe’s economic power and defend its sovereignty while anchoring legitimacy in democratic politics.