Looking back, looking forward: A conversation with Josep Borrell

Josep Borrell joined Luuk van Middelaar for a conversation at the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics, as his final political event as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. An economist, Stanford-trained mathematician and aeronautical space engineer, with a degree awarded the year Apollo 11 landed on the moon, Borrell has extensive political experience in high office, having been part of the first Gonzales governments, then as the President of the European Parliament (2004–07) and as Spain’s Foreign Minister (2018–19). In his wide-ranging discussion with BIG’s director, Josep Borrell offers a frank assessment of his past experiences and his concerns and hopes for the future of world politics.

Luuk van Middelaar You have been traveling relentlessly. . . . Over the weekend you were in the Middle East, [then at] the G7 in Italy. So as your mandate draws toward a close, what is now [at the] top of your mind?

Josep Borrell [W]hat is high in my mind today, . . . to be frank, is Gaza. I think that what’s happening in [the] Middle East in general is an open wound for humanity. . . . The situation in the Middle East goes beyond anything that Europeans should accept. And it’s going to be a big problem for us. From the point of view of our credibility with the rest of the world, and also our capacity to influence events.

Luuk van Middelaar In the five years you have had this important role, [and from] the outset, indeed, you already saw the challenge – maybe earlier than others – of this [impending] power dimension. . . . Whether five years on, the EU has learned or succeeds better in using that language [of power]. And . . . if so, has . . . Gaza, or perhaps more the war in Ukraine, . . . acted as a catalyst for that realization and awareness?

Josep Borrell Certainly the war in Ukraine, or against Ukraine, has acted as a catalyst. Some days before the war started, we published the Strategic Compass, which is a kind of a White Book on European defence avant la lettre, without using that name, . . . on how the Europeans have to manage their common defence. And without the war in Ukraine, certainly, this Strategic Compass would have [passed] with much less interest from the wider public, from the press, from everybody. But when I said, presenting the Strategic Compass, ‘Europe is in danger’. . . people looked at me saying, well, this is a marketing sentence in order to sell the product. Some days later the war started. . . . Nobody was convinced before the war that the war was going to start [or] that [it] was going to [be continuing] almost three years later. And certainly today, everybody agrees that Europe is in danger.

Luuk van Middelaar Which danger?

Josep Borrell The danger of war. . . Now we are not belligerent, but we are engaging a lot in this war, which is becoming a globalized war with the North Korean troops on the European border. Who could have imagined three years before that we were going to have North Korean troops on the European border? Fighting, not [being tourists].

Luuk van Middelaar And do you think . . . a lot has changed [with] the war? It was a moment of solidarity. I think it was also experienced as a European or as a continental moment . . . by public opinion across the EU, not only . . . by the Eastern border states. . . .

Josep Borrell I think that it was an extraordinary moment for the Europeans. The Sunday, I remember very well, when . . . I started phoning my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Council, [asking] them, would you agree on using the money of the European Peace Facility to provide arms to Ukraine? . . . Finally, in a couple of hours, everybody agreed on something that [was] unthinkable some days before. And we mobilized financial resources to arm Ukraine. This was almost three years ago. Today, the answer would have not been the same because, unhappily, today there are at least two member states who are no longer on board [with] this policy of arming Ukraine to resist an invasion. . . . But at that moment, I remember very well, I had the answer of my colleague saying, ‘Okay, let’s use the European Peace Facility to arm Ukraine.’ I asked my staff to present a proposal . . . [f]or a Council decision. And they came with the proposal of giving 50 million euros to Ukraine. Fifty million. And I said, ‘Are you crazy? We are talking about a war. Do you know what . . . it mean[s], a war? Put three zeros behind. Put three zeros.’ And then we started taking things seriously. . . . And I think it may be the best moment of my five-year term.

Luuk van Middelaar [It was an extraordinary few days] . . . there was also, at the same time, the discussion on temporary protection for refugees. The Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, brought into play the prospect of Ukraine joining the European Union. . . . [All in the space of a weekend] back in February about 1,000 days ago more or less. And the question is of course what are the next steps? . . . Not only the changes within the EU, as you mentioned two dissident member states, but also changes in Washington. Are you worried when you look at that prospect?

Josep Borrell Certainly. . . . This is the question, the issue: what [will] Europeans . . . do if the new American administration . . . no longer support[s] Ukraine? And this is the question that the Ukrainians asked me when I was in Kyiv, when I was visiting the front line, from the last soldier to the president of the country; this is the question, exactly the same question that they asked me in February 2022, when I was in Donbas, ‘When they attack, are you going to support us? Are you going to support us?’ And at that moment, I couldn’t say yes, because I was not sure. Well, the same question comes back. ‘How much are you going to support us?’ I don’t think anyone knows the answer. So, we will find . . . out when we get there. Which is . . . probably the most we can say right now.

Luuk van Middelaar [What of] speaking the language of power.

Josep Borrell To speak the language of power – which is a beautiful sentence, no? – You need one thing, a key ingredient, which is unity. . . . If we live in an ecosystem where the decisions are taken by unanimity, you cannot speak the language of power, . . . you cannot even open your mouth, if we are not united. If you are not united, which kind of position do you have in a moment that requires unanimity? How many times [have] I had to say, ‘There is not a European position on that’?

Luuk van Middelaar This was probably one of the most frustrating parts of your job, that you could not speak when there was no unanimous position.

Josep Borrell Well, I’ve spoken nevertheless. . . .
I would be very happy if member states were [to] just [stick] to the treaty about unanimity because they add more requirements of unanimity than the ones required by the treaty. When the treaty doesn’t require unanimity, member states come and say, ‘Ah, it has to be by unanimity.’ But why? ‘Because we prefer [it].’ And why do they prefer [it]? Because at the end, everybody wants to keep a veto right. That’s the reality.

Josep Borrell [When] they see a statement and they say, ‘Well, it’s a statement of the High Representative, not of the European Union.’ What does that mean? Well, it means that there is a strong majority behind the High Representative, but not unanimity. And you have to look carefully [at] the wording to [see] the difference between a statement of the European Union or a statement by the European Union High Representative. When there is not unanimity, but we are close to it, two, three people disagreeing, then [the statements] go out anyway. Because I think there is a strong position, and I don’t pretend to speak in the name of the European Union. By the way, who speaks on behalf of the European Union? This is a great question.

Luuk van Middelaar It’s an old question. Who speaks on behalf of the European Union?

Josep Borrell Many people have asked me, around the world. Who speaks on behalf of the European Union? And my answer is depending on what. . . . The treaty is clear about it. There is an article in the treaty [that] says clearly the Commission represents the European Union on the matters of their competence. And in particular, on foreign and security policy, the Commission does not represent the Union. It’s set in the treaty black [and] white. Do you think this is the perception of people around the world?

Luuk van Middelaar No.

Josep Borrell Then we have a problem. If people don’t know who represents the Union, we have a problem.

Luuk van Middelaar I want to briefly come to that, also to your sensitivity to language, which is particularly strong. I think you not only had this phrase of Europe using the language of power, but you were also very much aware of the power of language. . . . Once you told me that very often it happens that your staff or your advisors, ahead of important meeting, they tell you, ‘Vous ne pouvez pas dire ça.’ (You can’t say that).

Josep Borrell Yes, ‘You cannot say this’: [it’s] the favourite sentence within the EEAS. . . . You have to say the truth. You have to say only the truth, but you’re not obliged to say all the truth. In some cases, you don’t have to say everything that you have in mind, especially if you’re not being backed by the club which you represent. In some cases, I think it’s absolutely necessary to say the truth because it’s so evident, the truth, that if you don’t say it, people don’t believe you anymore. . . . You lose credibility. . . . Who can believe that today the humanitarian law and the law of war is not [sic] being respected by Israel? Who can believe in it? Certainly not me.
. . . I presented the report [re. Gaza] to the Council saying, these are the facts. According with these facts, I think that we have to take action. And after [that] nothing happened, because [there] was not enough support. But at a certain moment, it is so [self-]evident that you lose credibility if you continue denying [it]. You continue saying, the rule of law has to be respected. . . . Announcing for the 20th time that the law has to be respected doesn’t add any kind of information to the question. The question is, is it being respected? Do you have an opinion about it? Stop saying it has to be. Say [whether] it is or it is not.
. . .

Luuk van Middelaar [O]n Russia, you could say that it has taken time, but there seems to be . . . some alignment and convergence to do more, in particular on the whole area of defence with a view to a threat at Europe’s Eastern borders. And that is no longer a theoretical threat, but a real threat. . . . You yourself, in a way, you have been one of the driving forces to make Europe more defence-ready with the European Peace Facility, with the initiative of Shells for Ukraine, et cetera. But when I look at the next European Commission, I see there will also be . . . a Defence Commissioner. . . . So what is your view on these developments, this . . . institutional shift, and do you think . . . that helps and contributes to a stronger European defence, not least vis-à-vis Russia, or is all or some of it distracting from the results?

Josep Borrell I think . . . we should try to avoid institutional confusion, because the Commission has no competence on defence. It has competence on the industry of defence, because [that’s] a sector of industry. Defence industry is a sector of industry, and the entry point of the Commission into defence is competitiveness. But we have to clarify the terms. The Commissioner for Defence will, in fact, be mainly a Commissioner for the Defence Industry, and I am very happy to have someone in charge of the defence industry. But on the other hand, there is a body, an organization, the European Defence Agency, which has as a duty to do everything needed in order to boost the technological and industrial base of defence. So let’s say that there [is] double tasking here, so people will be [tasked] with the same thing. With a difference: the Commission has financial resources, has a budget. The European Defence Agency has not a budget in order to supply resources directly to the industry, and that’s why it’s so important that the competitiveness side and the defence side, the intergovernmental side and the community side, they work together. Otherwise, it will be an institutional confusion. Who does what?
. . . To support the effort of Ukraine is another thing. This is not a European defence. . . . We have already issued common debt. We can go deeper and we can call for a debt issue in order to buy more arms for Ukraine. And maybe, maybe this question will be put on the table. Do you want to support more Ukraine quickly? When? Where [is] the money? We don’t have it. Issue bonds. But this is one thing. Another thing could be to boost the capacity of our industrial sector. And then you will start discussing who benefits from it. Who has an industrial sector? Where [is] the money . . . going to go. And you can imagine a third purpose, which is to arm the armies of the European Union member states. And on that, I heard the German chancellor say, ‘No way. I’m not going to pay to arm the armies of others. Each one has to pay for their own army because defence is a national responsibility. Defence is a competence of member states. I will not pay for it.’ I heard him saying that several times. So there are three issues: to arm Ukraine, to boost our industrial capacity, or to increase the equipment of our armies. . . .

Luuk van Middelaar Between the last two, there’s often also a contradiction. Where do we spend, when we spend money on buying weapons? Is that, to put it clearly, to buy American weapons so they stay in Europe? Put it as a bit of a shortcut, but to placate Washington to linger on . . . as our protector, which is one view, very strong in Europe, and another view is, yes, we need our own defence industry.

Josep Borrell We need a strong defence industry. . . . we have been going into a process of disarmament and reducing our capacity to produce arms from the humble ammunition for a gun to the most sophisticated drone or the most sophisticated fighter. We don’t have the capacity we need. . . . So we have to produce more, and we are producing more. . . . We cannot replace the American production of fighters overnight. We don’t have the capacity to substitute all F-35s.

Luuk van Middelaar [L]et me conclude with a big question, . . . zooming out, because you have also the immense advantage of experience. . . . What qualities? What strengths? What virtues can Europe mobilize in this age to navigate that course [of avoiding another Cold War] and to the extent that we have agency as Europe?

Josep Borrell We have a lot. We have a lot. We have a lot.

Luuk van Middelaar What is your view on . . . the world order? . . .

Josep Borrell The world order has to be fully managed, fully rearranged. That is easier said than done. But it has to be fully rearranged. People around the world don’t accept the world order . . . the way it was designed in 1945. In 1945 China didn’t exist. I am coming from the G7 meeting, and I met there with foreign ministers of South East Asia. Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, all these countries in 1945, they were on their knees. . . . Others were colonies . . . or they were one people. Today, it’s impossible to tell them that the world order has to be the same [as in] 1945. It’s impossible for them to accept it and they will not accept it, China in particular, but Indonesia neither. . . . The world architecture has to be changed . . . I am completely sure. And we are not interested in being dragged into a total confrontation with China. I try to avoid it.

Josep Borrell I think I have a duty of memory. I think I have to try to write how I perceive the events of these years. And I think that we are going in a contrary direction to what was [willed] by the Lisbon Treaty. . . . I think that if we want to be cooperative, we have to create an institutional setting . . . to make cooperation effective. And that’s what I think we have to work with because otherwise the European Union will be spending too much work, too much effort, too much political will on internal issues instead of having a strong capacity to act outside. And when you said ‘the language of power’, . . . the European Community at the beginning was created against the idea of power. It was created . . . renouncing power because we abused so much of power that we said, . . . ‘No more power. No, let’s forget about power. Trade, rule of law, instead of power.’ And when I wanted to create the rapid deployment capacity, why this strange name rapid deployment capacity? Because when I put the right name, rapid deployment force, member states said, ‘Force, hmm, force, you said force, you want to use force, no, no, no, no way, we don’t use force.’ And then what do we call it? Or rapid deployment capacity. Capacity of what? Capacity of what? Or using force, oh, hey, but we don’t say that. . . . And now we realize that you have to have power. You have to have power. Not necessarily military power, but power. And use it. And we have powers. We have many more powers than the ones we are ready to use. Because to use [them], we need unity. And once again, the foundational issue of the institutions is the willingness to use our capacities together. This is the real problem. And this has to be a political solution. And the political solution has to be found at the level of the European societies. At the level of people, we live in a democratic system and we cannot act against the will of the people. And people have to be convinced of what we are doing.

Luuk van Middelaar Hence the importance of clear language.

Josep Borrell Hence the importance of democracy. Hence the importance of democracy, the public debate. I’m actually presenting people with the reason for doing something or not doing something. And that is the same [for whatever] you want to discuss. . . . Be it Middle East, . . . Ukraine, . . . the relationship with China, . . . everything that matters. It’s an issue of making people understand . . . the challenges we are facing.