Only Strength Can Deter Europe’s Foes

Faced with tectonic shifts, Europe has been jolted into a monumental and unprecedented  defence effort. As is often the case, media focus has centred around headline-grabbing figures, notably the European Union’s plans to allocate €800 billion to rearmament. The 27 heads of state and government have already acknowledged that the bulk of this effort will fall to national budgets—as defence remains a national competence—and that the EU must play a supporting role by helping member states meet this financial challenge. This means attracting private investment and lifting regulatory obstacles while strengthening incentives for cooperation. Sovereignty, autonomy and the urgent need to build a strong European industrial and technological base have been thrust centre stage. 

As Europe moves toward establishing itself as a military power capable of deterring a range of threats in the face of US disengagement, it must navigate several potential pitfalls.  One is the failure to build the public support needed to prioritise defence—or to sustain the political will that, for now, is largely driven by emotion. Another is the temptation to exploit the windfall of increased budgets to pursue unilateral action at the national level at the cost of fragmentation that would undermine both operational and industrial effectiveness. A further risk lies in choosing cooperation frameworks and methods that exclude valuable European partners—such as the UK, Norway or Turkey—as well as non-European allies. 

For this large-scale defence effort to be a success, two elements are of vital importance. First, defence must not be limited to armaments; it also involves military action, which requires a clear and effective chain of command. Europeans have relied on NATO for collective territorial defence, and thus on SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) and its American commander (Supreme Allied Commander Europe or SACEUR). The question of SHAPE’s availability in the event of a US refusal to engage must be addressed with absolute clarity. In such a scenario, a genuine European headquarters must be rapidly established to command complex, large-scale operations, without the need to improvise a patchwork of national command structures. 

Second, it is a question of selecting the right tools. The long-standing debate over a European preference in arms procurement continues to stall the Commission’s proposed industry support programme. Today, Ukraine’s intermittent access to US resources highlights an urgent need for independence. The legal and operational constraints tied to purchasing American equipment have yet to be fully assessed. Only by mastering “design authority” will it be possible to fully control and adapt weapons systems to meet evolving combat needs.  

Generating the Required Momentum 

Despite accelerated production capacity, a range of needs remain unmet. Previous purchases of US equipment will continue to require spare parts and ammunition. However, the European Commission’s role is to bolster industrial competitiveness. In this context, is it sensible to forge ahead with a fixed share of non-European acquisitions as part of the regulation underpinning joint financing? This inconsistency highlights the importance of selecting support tools that respect the primary authority of states, armed forces chiefs and defence ministers. 

When states commit three per cent or more of their GDP to defence, they must retain full control over their strategic choices. The EU’s role is to remove the obstacles that hinder the transition to a war economy in defence spending—not only financial constraints, but also rules on competition, procurement and environmental compliance. It must also encourage inter-state cooperation, for example through VAT exemptions or by creating a European equivalent of the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. 

Finally, the EU should scale up or fully fund projects of common interest. One key area for investment is space, such as the Galileo satellite system, which enables the EU to avoid dependence on the US GPS network. And given the unpredictability surrounding Starlink, who can now doubt the strategic value of the upcoming Iris² secure communication constellation? 

The EU can leverage both joint tools and intergovernmental cooperation. The European Defence Agency (EDA), which maintains an armaments focus, exists for this purpose. The European Council has backed the priorities defined by the Member States. To align efforts, cooperation must start with a needs assessment and be followed through to training and maintenance. The EDA provides the framework and allows for various formats as long as two Member States are involved, with EU budget support, potentially providing the necessary momentum. 

To offer an effective deterrence, strength must be projected. It is not 'Brussels' and its institutions, it is Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, France—or rather all European states, along with the British, Norwegians, and Turks—acting together as Europe. If one of them is attacked, they have treaty obligations to assist. Russia’s instincts have grown out of an understanding of its own history and of all its encounters with its neighbours in war and in peace.  The same is true for the states of Europe.  Russia cannot seriously dismiss this radical evolution of a united European bloc to its West.