The Global South: What's in a name?

The power of nomenclature

When European explorers first ventured across the oceans in search of new lands and riches, they nonchalantly named the places and peoples they encountered. As the West’s global dominance recedes, so too does its semantic grip on the world. This power shift plays out most clearly is in the use of the term ‘Global South’. Many in the West dislike it for a variety of reasons, calling it misleading¹ or pernicious², some even suggesting an outright boycott of its usage. However, the geopolitical fact is that Global South countries are now in a position to be called by their own chosen name(s).

Global South criticism

The concept of the ‘Global South’ is not new, but uneasiness about it as a descriptor surfaces increasingly frequently in the political debate. The first point of criticism is straightforwardly geographical: some Global South countries, such as India, lie in the northern hemisphere. No clear North–South line can be drawn on the map to divide countries in terms of their levels of economic development or political alliances. The equator does not serve this purpose, nor does the more elaborate Brandt Line (developed in the 1980s), which delineates a North–South division that loops around Australia and New Zealand to bring them into the North.

A similar argument can be made about the omnipresent use of ‘West’, which includes countries like Japan, Singapore and New Zealand. Although some countries in Asia or Latin America have leapt from one category into the other over past decades, the North–South divide remains a relevant conceptual abstraction.

A second hesitation in using the term ‘Global South’ relates to its colonial connotations. The designation automatically raises the spectre of subjugation and exploitation by countries in the North. As (Portuguese) UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated bluntly, ‘The Global North, specifically my own continent of Europe, imposed colonial rule on much of the Global South for centuries, through violence and coercion.’³ Some critics would prefer a more anodyne or less ‘loaded’⁴ term to avoid the recollection of historic guilt. At the same time, for users of ‘Global South’, this association with the past is part of their political narrative. Neutral terminological ground in this debate is elusive.

A third and final argument against ‘Global South’ is that it plays into China’s hands. The People’s Republic traditionally asserts itself as the leader of the non-Western, developing world. Mao’s emissary Zhou Enlai attended the founding of the non-aligned movement in Bandung (1955), an act of colonial emancipation that was seminal to the strategic awareness of its participants.

In joining the non-aligned group, with leading voices from Egypt, India, Indonesia and Ghana, China had leverage in the superpower rivalry between the US and the USSR. Sixty years on, the strategic boardgame has changed. Now China itself stands toe-to-toe with the US, a fact not lost on other states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Neither Brazil nor India wants to be a member of a China-led club. In this respect, the fear of a Beijing-branded term seems overstated.

The Global South by the Global South

As with all political categories, the terms chosen by the members of a group to refer to themselves should be taken seriously. 

It is impossible, despite the concerns of some commentators, to ignore the fact that India’s Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi hosted three ‘Voice of Global South’ summits between 2023 and 2024. Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has used the term regularly and insistently, from his opening speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2023 to his address at the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting a year later. Nor is it a coincidence that Brazil and Argentina (under a pre-Milei government) announced plans to establish a currency alliance, named ‘Sur’ (‘south’ in Spanish). It would be condescending to think that a three-times elected Brazilian president would invoke the term ‘Global South’ naively.

Beyond economic taxonomies 

During the Cold War era, the classification of nations based on their economic standing and level of development became a convenient shorthand for the ranking of power: First, Second and Third World.

Since then, a plethora of economic terms – underdeveloped, developing, emerging, industrializing – have been employed to categorize states that did not (yet) have the West’s levels of GDP per capita. The stakes of classification can be high. For instance, those ‘graduating’ from the status of middle-income countries (MICs) – a term crafted and applied by the World Bank – can no longer receive official development aid. In current UN debates about global climate financing, for example, China’s insistence that it be considered a ‘developing nation’ does not go down well in Western capitals.

Although such notions are useful to describe an economic reality, they do not accurately capture the politics. This is why falling back on terms like ‘emerging economies’ in order to avoid using the term ‘Global South’ does not work. Not only because not all of them could be classified as emerging, but above all because it misses the point. Even if ‘Global South’ contains allusions to economic taxonomies, the actors using it do so because of its political significance.

What it is and is not

Leaders are perfectly aware that the Global South does not constitute a coalition of countries with a unified agenda. They have few shared interests and values and can be found at both ends of the democracy/autocracy spectrum. There are no clearly demarcated membership criteria and no institutional structure in place.

This being said, what Global South countries do have in common is a history of being colonized or overpowered by countries from the West. This creates a bond. Moreover, after the Cold War period when they were forced to choose sides ideologically and strategically, many are now in a strong enough position to navigate among great powers and to voice their interests in a pragmatic way.

This pragmatism is often poorly understood by European audiences, who tend to expect an exclusive allegiance. For instance, the lack of support for economic sanctions against Russia was perceived either as a lack of solidarity with Ukraine or as confrontational towards the EU. However, when examining UN resolutions condemning Russia's invasion, the broad, cross-regional support from the majority of nations is undeniable. A similar perplexity can be found concerning the BRICS grouping, with some observers struggling to understand how Xi and Modi can shake hands at summits, despite the military tension and persisting clashes on the China–India border.

Given shared grievances against a Western-led order, it should not be surprising that the major unifying theme for the Global South, which brings together a plurality of outlooks and a diversity of interests, is the reform of global international institutions. This includes advocating for the inclusion of African countries as permanent members of the UN Security Council (a request dating back to Bandung) as well as reforming the international financial architecture, with the underlying objective of challenging the power of the US dollar. In parallel, BRICS countries are looking to establish alternative multilateral institutions, such as the New Development Bank (founded in 2014, based in Shanghai and currently led by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff). 

This offers a glimpse into how the Global South may well organize itself in the future. Its strategic interests are so diverse that any institutionalization, beyond summitry (for instance with the emergence of a headquarter-based body championing countries’ interests), is highly unlikely. Even on the single issue of greater representation in multilateral institutions, there is no coordinated agenda beyond the rhetoric. Instead, as with the BRICS and its recent expansion into the BRICS+, various formal or informal multi-state organizations are expected to come and go. Examples include MIKTA, which brings together Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia, or the Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government. For Global South countries, participating in such limited, pragmatic groups can be an attractive way to further their interests without being tied to any particular bloc.

Conclusion: no more westsplaining

Major power shifts now challenge the West's capacity to shape the narrative. Agency is no longer the prerogative of the Global North and for many, choosing to be known as the Global South is the first act in breaking that cycle.

Just as ‘mansplaining’ patronizes women, we should perhaps also talk about the ‘westsplaining’ tendency among some Western commentators to dictate to the Global South how to refer to themselves, or to provide unsolicited advice on using more ‘acceptable terms’. Westsplaining the Global South is unhelpful and inappropriate. 

For Europe – for reasons stretching from the fight against climate change to securing supply chains for critical raw materials or digital connectivity – engaging with countries in the Global South as strategic partners is more than ever a geopolitical priority. Addressing them correctly by their preferred names is a first step in that engagement.